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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2013

TAGS: PREL PARM PHUM ECON ETRD KN AF PK PARM PHUM ECON ETRD KN AF PK IT ITPREL  
SUBJECT: ITALY: DPRK; AFGHAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT;  
PAKISTAN'S FUTURE

REF: A. STATE 1211

1B. ROME 26 (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED BY: DCM EMIL SKODON, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

11. (C) SUMMARY: MFA OFFICIALS ASSURED CHARGE THAT THE GOI WOULD PURSUE NO INITIATIVE ON THE DPRK, INCLUDING THE IDEA OF "HUMANITARIAN" OIL SHIPMENTS, WITHOUT OUR CONCURRENCE AND COLLABORATION. CHARGE ALSO SOUGHT REACTION TO REF A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN TRADE TO AFGHANISTAN, DISCUSSED PAKISTAN'S FUTURE, AND CONSIDERED REFORM OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (SEPTEL). END SUMMARY.

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DPRK AND HUMANITARIAN OIL SHIPMENTS  
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12. (C) CHARGE MET MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR ASIA GUIDO MARTINI (FORMERLY ITALY'S AMBASSADOR TO SEOUL) AND UNDER SECRETARY FOR ASIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS MARGHERITA BONIVER IN

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SEPARATE COURTESY CALLS JANUARY 13. THE GOI'S RECENT PROPOSAL TO OFFER "HUMANITARIAN" OIL SHIPMENTS TO NORTH KOREA (REF B) WAS A PRIMARY TOPIC OF CONVERSATION IN BOTH MEETINGS, AND BOTH MARTINI AND BONIVER ASSURED CHARGE THAT ITALY WOULD DO NOTHING WITHOUT USG CONCURRENCE AND COLLABORATION. IT

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APPEARED THE IDEA HAD BEEN MARTINI'S WHILE BONIVER WAS AWAY FROM ITALY ON HOLIDAY LEAVE; SHE QUASHED THE INITIATIVE UPON HER RETURN, TELLING CHARGE THE IDEA OF AN INDIVIDUAL ITALIAN ROLE IN NORTH KOREA WAS "TOTALLY WRONG." THE GOI SHOULD NOT MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL WITHOUT COORDINATING IT WITH THE U.S. IN ADVANCE; "IT WOULD BE ALL BUT FATAL TO SEND MIXED SIGNALS." THE ITALIANS, HOWEVER, REMAIN INTERESTED IN COOPERATING WITH THE USG ON KOREA AND WOULD LIKE TO BE USEFUL, IF THE U.S. THOUGHT THE OIL SHIPMENTS OR ANY OTHER INITIATIVE COULD HELP MOVE THE SITUATION WITH THE DPRK FORWARD. NOTING THAT WASHINGTON HAD NOT OVERALL PROVIDED GUIDANCE DIRECTLY ON THE OIL PROPOSAL, CHARGE ADVISED HIS INTERLOCUTORS THAT NOW WAS NOT THE TIME FOR ANY INITIATIVE WHICH COULD BE PERCEIVED AS REWARDING PYONGYANG'S BAD BEHAVIOR.

13. (C) MARTINI REVEALED THAT THE GOI HAD DISCUSSED THE PROPOSAL WITH ITS EU PARTNERS (COMMENT: PRESUMABLY BEFORE BONIVER'S RETURN), AND REPORTED THAT EUROPE WAS "AMAZINGLY DIVIDED" ON THE PROPOSAL. THE UK AND FRANCE ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED; MARTINI SAID FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC "PERSONALLY REJECTS" ANY APPROACH TO NORTH KOREA. THE DANES AND DUTCH ARE ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS OPPOSED. HE DESCRIBED THE FRG AND SPAIN AS BEING "AGAINST BUT OPEN," AND CHARACTERIZED ITALY, SWEDEN, FINLAND AND THE EU COMMISSION AS BEING "OPEN TO FINDING A SOLUTION OR HUMANITARIAN GESTURE TOWARD THE NORTH." HE underscored that in any event, the GOI wanted to move in accordance with the U.S. that would also make it easier to find consensus within the EU. MARTINI EXPLAINED THAT PRIME MINISTER BERLUSCONI AND FOREIGN MINISTER FRATTINI WOULD LIKE TO SEE ITALY TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO HELP THE U.S. REACH A SOLUTION IN KOREA. HE WAS CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT THE

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SOLUTION LAY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE DPRK. "IF YOU THINK WE CAN BE USEFUL, GIVE US A SIGN."

14. (C) MARTINI SAID REPEATEDLY THAT FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION WAS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE WHEN DEALING WITH AN "UNPREDICTABLE OUTCAST" LIKE THE DPRK. EVEN AFTER FOUR YEARS IN SEOUL, HE FINDS THE NORTH KOREANS COMPLETELY UNPREDICTABLE. THE NORTH KOREANS, HE FUMED, USE BEHAVIOR WHICH IS COMPLETELY AT ODDS WITH THEIR AIMS, AND IT SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVINCE THEM TO CHANGE. NONTHELESS, HE REMAINED CONVINCED PYONGYANG "WANTS A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE U.S., DISCUSSIONS, AND "REASSURANCE." HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THE DPRK MIGHT EVENTUALLY REQUEST A SEPARATE PEACE TREATY WITH THE U.S. AT THE EXPENSE OF SOUTH KOREA. HE ALSO BELIEVED THE DPRK WANTED DIALOGUE WITH THE SOUTH, BUT THOUGHT INTERACTION WITH THE U.S. WAS MORE IMPORTANT.

15. (C) CHARGE ASKED MARTINI WHY, IF WHAT IT WANTED WAS DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S., THE DPRK HAD INTERRUPTED THE PROCESS THAT PROVIDED FOR DIALOGUE. "I SAID THEY WERE UNPREDICTABLE," MARTINI REPLIED. HE OPINED, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE U.S. WERE TO ESTABLISH POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE NORTH AND "SETTLE PROBLEMS WITH THEM ONCE AND FOR ALL," IT MIGHT HELP -- ALTHOUGH THEY WILL ALWAYS BE UNPREDICTABLE, HE ADDED. THE IDEA OF A NON-AGGRESSION PACT IS LUDICROUS TO THE WEST, BUT WITH NORTH KOREA, IT MIGHT HELP. THEN, MARTINI SUGGESTED, PROVIDE FURTHER ASSISTANCE ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLY, HELP FOR THE STARVING POPULATION.

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ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AMAD-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	COME-00	CTME-00	INL-00	C-00	USNW-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00
	DOTE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00	EB-00	EXIM-01	E-00
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VC-00	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	ITC-01	LAB-01	L-00	CAC-00	VCE-00	M-00
	AC-01	NEA-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OES-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SA-00	R-00	SSD-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00
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FM AMEMBASSY ROME  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7770  
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMCONSUL FLORENCE  
AMCONSUL MILAN  
AMCONSUL NAPLES  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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PAKISTAN'S FUTURE

MARTINI SHARED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE U.S. SHOULD RESOLVE THE SITUATION WITH KOREA, AND THE SOLUTION SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY CONFIRMED AT AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM. "REMEMBER, CHINA AND RUSSIA ARE WITH YOU ON ALMOST ALL POINTS." HE REPEATED THAT THE PROSPECT OF A DIRECT SOLUTION AND STABILITY MIGHT WIN OVER THE DPRK.

16. (C) CHARGE NOTED U.S. FRUSTRATION THAT, WHILE WE WERE WILLING TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN THE FUTURE, TO TALK, TO HAVE A MORE NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DPRK, NORTH KOREA SEEMED TO BELIEVE IT WOULD ONLY BE REWARDED IF IT BEHAVED BADLY. THE SECRETARY WAS CONVINCED IT WAS VITAL TO REVERSE THIS "NEGATIVE PROGRESSION" AND PROVE TO THE NORTH THAT SUCH BEHAVIOR WOULD BRING COSTS, NOT REWARDS. CHARGE ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BE REALISTIC IN OUR EXPECTATIONS, RECOGNIZING THAT WE CANNOT SATISFY ALL OF NORTH KOREA'S. THE USG, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY, HAS MADE CLEAR THAT IF THE DPRK REVERSES SOME OF ITS ACTIONS, THE U.S. IS OPEN TO DIALOGUE AND TO A RESOLUTION. THE U.S. CANNOT REWARD UNREASONABLE DEMANDS; IT IS UP TO NORTH KOREA TO GET BACK INTO THE GAME. "IN SOME WAYS," MARTINI REPLIED, "SOLVING THE SITUATION IN IRAQ IS EASIER THAN SOLVING THE SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA."

17. (C) BONIVER ASKED CHARGE ABOUT THE DPRK VISIT TO FORMER  
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GOVERNOR/ENERGY SECRETARY BILL RICHARDSON. CHARGE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS A PERSONAL INVITATION AND NOT A BACK CHANNEL FOR THE USG, ALTHOUGH RICHARDSON WOULD LIKELY SHARE ANY INFORMATION OR IMPRESSIONS HE GAINED. THE U.S. CONTINUED TO SEEK GREATER CLARITY FOR WHY THE DPRK HAD TAKEN THE ACTION IT HAD. BONIVER NOTED SHE HAD RECENTLY MET WITH SEVERAL SOUTH KOREAN PARLIAMENTARIANS AND WAS SURPRISED TO FIND THEIR PRIMARY CONCERN WAS THAT THE NORTH'S ACTION MIGHT PROMPT JAPAN TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CHARGE SAID CHINA HAD SIMILAR CONCERNS. THEY AGREED A MORE SERIOUS CONCERN FOR

CHINA WAS THE PROSPECT OF MILLIONS OF REFUGEES IF WAR BROKE OUT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

PROMOTING TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

¶ 8. (C) WITH U/S BONIVER, CHARGE RAISED REF A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON ASSISTANCE CURRENTLY PROVIDED, OR IDEAS ON HOW, TO PROMOTE TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. NEITHER BONIVER NOR HER CHIEF OF STAFF, ALESSANDOR DI FRANCO (ALSO IN THE MEETING), SUGGESTED ANY ACTIVE ITALIAN PROGRAMS IN THESE AREAS. BONIVER SUGGESTED THAT INVESTMENT SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON LABOR-INTENSIVE IDEAS AND PROGRAMS, EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR MORE EMPLOYMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. SHE AGREED WITH CHARGE ON THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN BEGAN -- SOON -- TO SHOW RESULTS TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, IN ORDER TO SOLIDIFY SUPPORT FOR THE CENTRAL AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. BONIVER EXPRESSED SOME FRUSTRATION THAT SO MUCH GOI AID IS ALREADY COMMITTED THROUGH MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS, AND SAID UN AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS MUST BE PRESSED TO START SHOWING RESULTS, TOO.

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## PAKISTAN BIGGEST WORRY

¶9. (C) CHARGE ASKED BONIVER WHAT WORRIED HER MOST IN HER LARGE PORTFOLIO. (BONIVER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR EAST, SOUTHEAST, CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA, AS WELL AS IRAN AND GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.) "PAKISTAN," SHE REPLIED WITHOUT HESITATION. GENERAL MUSHARRAF HAS DONE A "FANTASTIC JOB FOR A DICTATOR," BONIVER CONTINUED, ADDING THAT SHE HAD A CERTAIN ADMIRATION FOR HIM. SHE EVALUATED HIS CHANCE OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL AS GOOD, "UNLESS HE IS ASSASSINATED." BUT HOW LONG, SHE WONDERED, WOULD THE RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISM BE CONTROLLED? SHE ALSO EXPRESSED LITTLE HOPE FOR PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC FUTURE; THE GOP ECONOMY, SHE ASSERTED, IS A WRECK. SEMBLER

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